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Abstract— Cooperation of nodes is a main issue of civilian
applications of mobile ad hoc networks. More precisely, mobile
nodes with few resources may try to maximize the benefits they
get from the network without participating to its services (e.g.
without forwarding packets of other nodes). A solution to this
problem is to use virtual currency mechanisms: nodes have to
pay to send packets and they are rewarded when they forward
packets of other nodes. Several papers of the literature have
shown that such models enforce individual node cooperation. We
address in this paper two main issues of these models that have
been left out: the computation by the sender of the price it will
be charged and the possibility to reward nodes depending on
their charge or resources. We show that it leads to a better load
balancing of the network.
I. INTRODUCTION
An ad hoc network is a collection of wireless mobile
hosts forming a spontaneous network without the aid of any
fixed infrastructure. They have potential application in civilian
and military environments such as disaster relief, conference,
wireless office, and battlefield. Ad hoc sensor networks for
monitoring environment are also being deployed.
In an ad hoc network a message sent by a node reaches all
its neighboring nodes that are located at distances up to the
transmission radius. A widely accepted basic graph-theoretical
model for ad hoc networks is the unit graph model, defined
in the following way. Two nodes A and B in the network are
neighbors (thus joined by an edge) if and only if the Euclidean
distance between their coordinates in the network is at most R,
where R is the transmission radius which is equal for all nodes
in the network. Due to the limited transmission radius, the
routes between two nodes are usually created through several
hops.
Most protocols developed for ad hoc networks usually
consider that nodes are cooperative. Indeed, in military or
emergency applications such collaboration can be assumed.
However, ad hoc networks also have a great potential in
civilian applications (for extending wireless internet connec-
tivity for example) where all nodes typically do not belong
to a single authority. In such context, malicious nodes could
try to cheat the network. A main cheat action would be
to not participate to routing by not forwarding any packet.
This cheating form is called selfishness, where nodes try to
maximize their own welfare for example to save some battery
power. Even non malicious nodes may yield to temptation to
avoid cooperation since the cost of the participation to network
functionalities may be very high for individual nodes: a simple
estimation says than when the average number of hops from
source to destination is 5 in an ad-hoc network then 80% of
the energy spent by a node to send packets is dedicated to
packet forwarding for other nodes.
The first work to point out the network service degradations
caused by selfish nodes was [1]. This paper shows that 10 to
40 % of misbehaving nodes cause 16 to 32 % of degradation of
the average throughput of the network. The watchdog approach
proposed in this paper allows route discovery protocols to
avoid selfish (or other kinds of misbehaving nodes) nodes and
thus to increase the network throughput in a relevant manner.
Anyway, the goal of this work was not to enforce nodes to
cooperate. Several algorithms exist in the literature to prevent
such selfishness, mostly based on reputation mechanism and
virtual currency mechanism. The idea is most of the time either
to reward cooperating nodes or to punish misbehaving nodes.
Virtual currency mechanisms are more robust to attacks.
Moreover, they could easily be adapted to network using di-
rectional antennas whereas reputation mechanisms are mostly
based on monitoring communication of other nodes. Thus,
we focus on virtual currency mechanisms and more precisely
on enhancing two well-known protocols: the nuggets [2] and
Sprite [3]. These protocols have been shown to be efficient
in enforcing node cooperation and robust to many attacks.
Anyway, in our opinion, two main issues of these protocols
have not yet been achieve: the algorithm lacks the computation
of the exact cost the sender has to pay to send a packet, and the
evaluation of the impact of a variable cost on the network. The
variable cost of the forwarding service is left out in most of
the papers where each node is paid the same amount of money
regardless of its state (energy, memory, network use...), or it
requires a large amount of knowledge of the network and thus
are only adapted for very small ones like in [4].
In this paper, we propose to enhance the virtual currency
based model by introducing the possibility for each interme-
diate node to announce the price it wants to be rewarded.
Moreover, we introduce the use of a multiple routes discovery
protocol so that the sender can select the cheapest route from
a set of possible paths leading to the destination. We propose
an evaluation of the impact of this choice to the load of the
network.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II describes
the nugget and the Sprite models. Section III introduces the
route cost computation in the route discovery protocols to pre-
calculate the cost of a route. Section IV introduces the use
of a route selecting mechanism based on the route cost and
discusses the multicast case. Section V gives an evaluation of
our propositions. At last, we conclude in Section VI.
II. EXISTING MODELS
We first present two main virtual currency models of the
literature that we use for discussion. In both algorithms, the
idea is to apply economical models to the network commu-
nication. Each communication has a cost, nodes have to pay
to send/receive packets, and nodes that forward other nodes’
packets earn some virtual currency. Nodes are thus enforced
to cooperate to the packet forwarding to be able to send their
own packets.
A. The nugget model
The nugget model has been introduced by Buttyán and
Hubaux in [2]. In this model, the virtual currency is called the
nuggets. As most of the works on nuggets, we will focus on the
packet purse model (PPM) which avoids network overloading
and which suppresses the risk for intermediate nodes to lose
nuggets. The only drawback of this model is that it does not
work for multicast. In the PPM model, a node that wants to
send a packet has to load it with nuggets to pay its transport.
Then, each forwarding node uses some nuggets of the packet
to pay itself before forwarding it. If a packet has not enough
nuggets to reach the destination, it is discarded. This model
has been shown to enforce node cooperation, see for example
[5] for an evaluation.
The model is simple, but the difficulty is to avoid nugget
tampering. Nodes may be tamped to forge nuggets, to reuse
them, to take nuggets from the packet without forwarding it,
and so on. Thus, the problem of respecting the forwarding
protocol is replaced by the problem of respecting the nugget
protocol. The solution proposed by Buttyán and Hubaux is to
introduce a hardware tamper-proof module, called the security
module, that is in charge of the nugget management. A new
header is added to packets and the action of the security
module occurs between the MAC layer and the Network Layer
in each direction.
The protocol is based on some hypotheses:
• the security modules are tamper-proof,
• there exists a public key infrastructure (i.e. security
modules can authenticate each others),
• the neighbors change slowly: a node can keep a view of
neighborhood with some ”Hello” protocol.
Each security module has a unique identifier, a public and a
private key, a nugget counter, and a list of neighbors (obtained
thanks to the ”Hello” protocol). Moreover, the security module
shares a secret with each neighbor in order to secure commu-
nications with this neighbor. Thus, the crypt header secures
the nugget management.
The security headers are used for one hop communications.
A security header starts with the identifier of the sender’s
security module. It contains the identity of the next hop
security module, the nuggets of the packet and a sequence
number shared by these two security modules to avoid packet
replays (this counter is initialized with a random value during
the ”Hello” protocol). Another counter is added to the header
to ensure that a node that temporally stops to cooperate will
pay it later. As the model is supposed to be used in the context
of multi-directional antennas, the same header contains the
acknowledgement of the packet for the security module of the
previous hop. As security modules do not trust their hosts,
they only increase their own nugget counters when receiving
the ACK for a packet. The protocol could be adapted for
directional antennas using a separated ACK message.
As conclusion, the nugget model has been shown to be very
efficient in enforcing cooperation of nodes. Nevertheless, some
points have to be improved:
• the PPM model does not work for multicast,
• the way of choosing the price to pay to intermediate nodes
is left out in most of the papers.
The last point is – to our mind – a relevant issue. First
for technical reasons since the source node needs to know
the needed number of nuggets otherwise the packet may be
discarded or the excess of nuggets may be lost. Second, as
mentioned in a lot of papers, the price could depend of several
factors as for example the battery level of the forwarding
nodes. We advocate that such consideration would increase
the lifetime of the network.
B. Sprite
In [3], the authors propose Sprite, a cheat proof algorithm
that was designed to get rid of the need of a tamper-proof
security module. As seen before, if virtual money is included
in the message, we need the routing algorithm to be run
by a trusted hardware. Sprite does not include money in the
message and lays on a central entity, which acts as a banking
service. This entity is called the Credit Clearance Service
(CCS) and is in charge of managing the nodes’ money. Sprite
relies on the fact that each node could have access to a fast
connection so that it can communicate with the CCS at a low
cost, and on a public key infrastructure. This connection does
not need to be always available but just as often as needed
for the node to get enough virtual money to send its message
until the next connection to the CCS.
When a node wants to send a message m, it sends the
message, the path, a sequence number and a digital signature
(RSA for example) on these data. Each node of the path is
able to check if the message is valid using the public key of
the source and a record of sequence numbers. If it decides
to forward the packet, it keeps a receipt of the message. So
that the receipt size keeps small, it consists of a message
digest, which is function of the message, the path, the sequence
number and the signature. Using this information, the CCS is
able to check if the receipt corresponds to a valid message.
Then, the CCS rewards the forwarding node and charges the
sender.
Sprite also avoids collusions and false receipts. If a node
colludes with the sender, it could be paid a behind-the-scene
price by the sender and thus save money for the sender by not
submitting its receipt. To counter this, the CCS charges the
sender an extra amount of money if the destination does not
report the receipt of the message. To prevent false receipts to
be made, the amount of money given to a node that reports
a receipt is greatly reduced if the destination does not report
the corresponding receipt.
In the multicast case (or in the route discovery case, which
can be viewed as a special case of multicast), nodes store
the route request as a receipt. If they decide to forward the
route request, hence if they decide to be a valid forwarder for
the route, they append their own address to the route request
and sign the extended message. When the CCS computes
payment, it rejects a route request if any of its signatures is
invalid. Furthermore, if the route request is part of another
route request submitted by the same node, the former one
is rejected. Finally, the CCS computes a tree based on the
accepted route requests. The sender shall pay more money to
the nodes that are non-leaf of the tree than to the nodes that
are leaves. An even smaller amount of money is paid for nodes
that are not included in the tree.
The main advantage of the sprite algorithm is that it does
not rely on a tamper-proof hardware and thus can be used in a
more general case. On the other hand, this algorithm has two
main drawbacks. First, to motivate the nodes to send receipts,
the algorithm takes as hypothesis that the nodes can have
access to a fast and cheap connection to the CCS. Second, they
only use static costs, which are identical for every node of the
network. In practice, forwarding a message will not cost the
same thing for all nodes. Moreover, the cost of forwarding for
a single node will not be the same at different times because
of energy or memory needs for example.
III. ROUTE COST COMPUTATION
The computation of the cost of the forwarding service is
left out in most of the papers dealing with virtual currency.
It is often considered as a constant (e.g. in the simulation of
[5] for example, each node forwarding a packet is given one
nuggets but the sender pay a constant number of nuggets, or
in [3] each intermediate node is paid a constant α except if the
message does not reach its destination) even if the possibility
of using factors like the remaining battery power or the charge
to compute the price of a service is a major argument for the
use of virtual currency mechanisms. To our knowledge, the
paper which is the closest to what we propose is [6]. In this
paper, each node has a battery utility function and a nugget
utility function. When receiving a packet, a node compute a
payoff depending on these two functions and on the number
of nuggets it is offered to forward the packet. If the payoff is
positive, it forwards the packet else it drops it. Two models
are presented, one with a fixed per hop charge and one with
auctions. In both model, the number of nuggets that a source
loads in a packet results from an estimation: a local forwarding
cost (the number of nuggets the source would need to forward
the packet in the first model and the result of auctions in the
second one) and the estimated number of hops toward the
destination. This estimation does not ensure that the packet
will reach the destination.
The problem for the sender to know the exact price of the
forwarding (on the total path) is a “technical” point which
seems to us to be very relevant: in an heterogeneous network,
the prices required by different nodes to forward the same
packet may be very different depending of their current state.
In the nugget model, if a packet does not contain enough
nuggets, it can be dropped and if it contains too many nuggets,
they are lost. In Sprite, as the payment is done after the arrival
of the message to its destination, knowing the price of the route
allows the sender to be sure that he has enough money to pay
all the forwarders. Indeed, if the sender cannot afford the cost
of its message, other nodes will not be paid for their action and
thus the CCS could blacklist the sender for example. Knowing
the cost of a forward by advance give the opportunity to the
sender to avoid bad action against it due to its lack of money.
We propose to combine the virtual currency mechanisms
with the route discovery protocol. Thus, a node that has a
route towards a destination will know the exact price it will
be charged for each packet sent on this route.
A. Route price discovering
The idea is to use the route discovery protocol to compute
the cost of sending a packet through the discovered route (from
now on we call this “the route cost”). Each node registered
in the route will announce the price it wants to be paid. This
price may depend on the battery level of the node, its load,
or any other factor. We suppose the existence of a mechanism
allowing each node to evaluate the price it wants to be paid
to forward a packet (different nodes may use different price
function).
We consider the DSR (Dynamic Source Routing) protocol
[7] as a basis of our work but other route discovery algorithms
could be adapted the same way. Let us recall the basic idea
of this protocol that is sufficient to explain our ideas:
• when a node is looking for a route, it sends a
ROUTE REQUEST,
• when a node, which is not the destination, receives a
ROUTE REQUEST message it has not received before, it
adds itself to the route and resends the message,
• when the destination node receives the message, it sends
a ROUTE REPLY message containing the route. As we
consider a network with symmetric links, we can consider
that the ROUTE REPLY uses the discovered route in the
reverse direction.
We simply propose to add the route cost with the route
returned to a node that has initiated a route discovery. The
cost is computed in the ROUTE REPLY to be included in real
routes and not in all the ROUTE REQUEST messages. Thus:
• we include a cost counter in the ROUTE REPLY message
that accumulates the cost of the route, and a timeout that
corresponds to the lifetime of the proposed price. As we
cannot assume the presence of a global clock, the timeout
is given in number of forwarded packets on this route,
• each node that receives the ROUTE REPLY, increases the
counter by the price it wants to be paid, and computes
the minimum of the timeout of the ROUTE REPLY and
the timeout it proposes before re-sending the message,
• when the source node receives the ROUTE REPLY mes-
sage, it contains the route, and the route cost valid for a
given number of packets.
Each node has to keep the price it has proposed for a given
route and the validity counter that will be decreased each time
a packet is forwarded on this route.
For example in Figure 1, S sends a ROUTE REQUEST
message to discover a route to D. Due to the broadcast, D
receives two possible routes SAB or SCEFG and chooses the
shortest one. Its sends a ROUTE REPLY message containing
the route on the reverse route with a route cost and a timeout
initialized to 0. Then, each node of the route adds to the cost
the price it asks to forward the messages: B proposes 5 for 10
packets and A proposes 3 for 9 packets thus it forwards the
route with a timeout of 9. The node S now knows the exact
price it will have to pay for each packet to D.
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Fig. 1. Inclusion of the route cost in the route.
The over cost of new information is very low: only two
counters are added to the ROUTE REPLY message. The prob-
lem is now to avoid nodes to cheat: nodes have to be paid the
price they have announced.
B. Implementation on the nugget protocol
It is necessary to avoid nodes to take more nuggets from a
packet that they have announced. We propose to include all
the necessary manipulations in the security modules for two
reasons:
1) to avoid nodes to cheat,
2) because the nugget counter is encapsulated in the secu-
rity module so all the nugget manipulations have to be
made by the security modules.
The difference between our solution and the original algorithm
is the addition of a security module header to the route discov-
ery messages too. This header is used in the ROUTE REPLY
messages: it only contains the counter representing the route
cost and the timeout. (Let us recall that nodes are not charged
nor rewarded for route discovery messages in the nugget
model). Then:
• when a node generates a ROUTE REPLY message, it adds
a security module header containing its identifier, the
identifier of the next security module in the route, the
route cost, the timeout initialized to 0, and a checksum
(CS),
• each security module adds the cost it wants to be paid in
the security module header and computes the new timeout
before sending the packet to the next node in the route,
• each security module maintains a cost table containing the
costs it has proposed for routes associated to timeouts. As
long as the route is active or the timeout is not exceeded,
the security module forwards packets for the same cost,
• when a node receives a packet that it has to forward,
it checks in its cost table if there exists a valid cost
for this route, then, it takes the announced number of
nuggets out of the purse and sends the packet to the
next node. Otherwise, it drops the packet and sends a
ROUTE TIMEOUT message to the source.
Let us notice that this solution does not imply any modification
of the DSR protocol.
C. Implementation on the Sprite protocol
As we could not rely on a security module, adding variable
cost in the Sprite protocol must be done with care. We must
add a mechanism which ensures that the price proposed by a
node to the sender will be the same price that this node will
request to the CCS.
We propose the following protocol:
• when replying to a route request, each node ni forwarding
the reply will add a couple ((pi, nbpi), si) to the reply
where pi is the price proposed by ni for forwarding
each message belonging to this route. The node also give
a number of packet nbpi which represents the validity
period for this price. So that the sender can verify that
the price has been given by the node ni (and thus not
forged by another node in order to cheat the sender), ni
also computes a digital signature si on (pi, nbpi),
• when sending a receipt to the CCS, a node ni also sends
((pi, nbpi), si) so that the CCS knows how much ni must
be paid,
• when the sender gets a connection to the CCS, it sub-
mits a new kind of receipt which embeds a couple
((pi, nbpi), si) for each node ni in the path. This set is
used by the CCS as a validation of the request of the
other nodes. As the node that proposed it has signed each
price, the CCS can verify that the sender tells the truth.
If the sender does not send this receipt, the CCS trusts
the receipt submitted by the forwarding nodes. Thus, if
the sender does not want to be cheated, it must send the
receipt.
All other mechanism of Sprite remains to keep the protocol
cheat proof. The α value, which is a constant value in the
original protocol, is replaced by the price proposed by each
forwarding node.
IV. USING COST INFORMATION IN ROUTING
The above-proposed solution allows the sender to know the
exact cost it will be charged to send a packet before sending it.
It also allows the forwarders to be paid according to what their
action will really cost them, thus motivating them to participate
to the network life. The problem left by such protocol is that
the sender does not have the choice of which route to take:
using protocol like DSR leads to choose the shortest path or
path on other criteria but these algorithms are most of the
time determinist. Indeed, the route returned by the route reply
is not necessarily the cheapest one. To let the sender choose
route, we can use a multiple routes discovery protocol. Then,
the sender knows more than one route to the destination and
thus can select the path regarding its own criteria, for example
the cheapest one.
Moreover, this kind of protocol could take into account that
some nodes of the networks are over used. Indeed, if those
nodes propose an expensive cost because of their network
load, they are not likely to be used as forwarder and therefore,
see their overhead lowered. As both protocols (nuggets and
sprite) use route discovery, they can easily be adapted for
using a multiple routes discovery algorithm. We propose in this
section a solution, which allows the sender to choose between
several routes and to select the cheapest one. We advocate that
this solution increases the network lifetime: the network load
is better balanced; nodes having more battery will be more
solicited.
A. Finding multiple paths to destination
To discover multiple routes, we use a protocol that we
presented in [8]. The protocol is based on the blind flooding
protocol [9] and is improved by two mechanisms to counter
the main drawbacks of this naive protocol for our purpose.
Blind flooding protocol is known to generate few paths be-
cause each node is allowed to forward a packet once and only
once and thus disabling potential better routes. To solve this
issue, we allow each node to forward the same packet more
than once and thus potentially enable new routes. To limit
the overhead generated by such a flooding, the forwarding
nodes are selected so that they are close to the source and the
destination.
The protocol works in two steps. First, the source sends a
route request to the destination. When the destination receives
the request packet, it forges a reply packet by including its
distance to the source, a set of sequence numbers and other
typical broadcast informations such as hop count, TTL and so
on.
Let d(s, d) be the distance between the source and the
destination, h the number of hops followed by the packet and
d(s, u) the distance between the client and the node u. Every
node u receiving a reply runs the following algorithm:
1) if the node has already forwarded a packet with the same
sequence number, the packet is discarded,
2) if h + d(s, u) > d(s, d) + k (where k is a protocol’s
parameter), the packet is discarded,
3) if the h is equal to half the distance between the source
and the destination, the node selects a random sequence
number in the set of sequence numbers included in the
packet and rebroadcast the packet using this sequence
number.
The first rule of the protocol is similar to the blind flooding.
The second one is used to target the source with the broadcast.
For this rule, we need to know the distance between every node
and the source node. This information can be obtained from
the request packet if the source sends it using an optimized
broadcast [10], [11], [12]. Each node receiving the request –
and deciding to forward it – remembers its distance to the
source.
The third rule is used to generate a bit more packets and
thus, more paths. As the destination sets how many sequence
numbers to use, it can control the overhead generated by the
reply. This overhead can also be controlled by changing the
value of k. If k is large, there are more paths and paths are
longer. But, on the other hand, there are more nodes that
forward the reply and thus, more overhead.
With our sequence number change policy and our limited
rebroadcast, we are able to compute an almost large paths set
by generating a small overhead.
More details on this multipath discovering protocol can be
found in [8].
B. Algorithm
We use exactly the same idea than the one developed in
section III-A in the case of DSR: each node forwarding the
packet inserts the amount of virtual money it wants to be
rewarded to forward the messages along this path. When
receiving all the paths, the sender is given a large amount
of choices so that it can select the best route for its needs
(cheapest, shortest...). Each intermediate node adds a local
timeout on each route in its cost table to be able to erase
routes that will not be chosen.
If we come back to the example of Figure 2, the node S
will now receive the first route with a cost of 8 but also the
second one which is longest but which costs only 4 as seen
in Figure 2.
The advantage of this solution is to let nodes decide the
price they require at a given moment to forward a packet.
Each sender is able to select the route it will use to optimize
one of the factors: the route cost, the route length, or the route
timeout. A node that has a lot of charge can increase the price
it wants to be rewarded at each new path request. Then, source
nodes may be tempted to choose longer but cheaper paths and
thus use forwarding nodes that are not overloaded. We show
in the following section that this solution increase the total
lifetime of the network.
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Fig. 2. Multiple paths including cost.
C. Using cost information for multicast routing
Computing the route cost before sending any data messages
allows us to use the same virtual currency mechanism for
multicast algorithms.
The easiest case is the Sprite algorithm, as the authors
describe a multicast extension to their protocol in [3]. The
extension they propose is totally compatible to what we
propose to add to the algorithm in section III-C. Thus, we
can use our extension of Sprite for multicast operations.
For the nuggets algorithm, the modification is also almost
straightforward. We just need a multicast protocol. Let us
consider for example the MAODV protocol [13].
1) Original algorithm: The MAODV algorithm is based
on a multicast tree (MT), which is built using a route request
(RREQ), route reply (RREP) scheme. When a node wishes to
join a multicast group, it sends a join RREQ message to the
group. This join RREQ can be either unicast or broadcast,
depending on the informations available to the prospective
node at the time of its request. Figure 3(a) illustrates the
propagation of the RREQ message if broadcast is used.
(a) RREQ propagation (b) RREPs sent back to
source
(c) MT branch addition
Fig. 3. MAODV Multicast join operation.
Any node forming the actual multicast tree, which receives
the join RREQ, sends back a RREP to the node that wants
to join the group using the classical AODV unicast algorithm
(see Figure 3(b)).
Upon receiving all the RREPs, the prospective node can
select the shortest path to one of the member of the multi-
cast tree. It then sends a multicast route activation message
(MACT) back to the node that has sent the RREP. Each node
on the path from the prospective node to the multicast tree
member becomes part of the multicast tree and will be used
to forward messages sent to the multicast group.
2) Sending a message to the multicast group: To send a
message to a multicast group, a node must send its message
to a member of the group and then, this member will use the
multicast tree to forward the message to the other members of
the group. Then, the total number of nuggets that a node will
have to pay to send a message to the multicast group is:
C = Cr + CMT + Cm,
where Cr is the cost of unicasting the message to the nearest
multicast tree member and CMT the cost of the multicast tree
(i.e. the sum of the nuggets that each multicast tree member
which is not a leaf will claim for forwarding a message to
the multicast tree). Cm is the number of nuggets asked by the
first multicast tree member reached. This cost is equal to 0 if
the first node reached is not a leaf (as it is already included
in CMT ).
Each node belonging to the multicast tree keeps the cost
CMT . When a node wishes to send a packet to multicast group,
it sends a RREQ packet to the multicast tree. The modification
of the previous protocol lies in the RREP packet. Each node
initiating such a packet must add a security header exactly as
it did in the unicast case. The route cost is initialized to CMT
and the timeout to TMT (which is the timeout of the multicast
tree). Each node which forwards the packet adds the value it
wants to be paid to the route cost and computes the minimum
of TMT and of the timeout it proposes.
When receiving the different possible RREPs, the prospec-
tive node can send a message to the multicast group with the
right number of nuggets in the purse, and choose the route to
the multicast tree depending on the cost.
3) Computing CMT and TMT : In order to know the cost
of a multicast routing so that a node can provide the right
number of nuggets, the multicast tree members need to keep
the values of CMT and TMT . Intuitively, CMT is the sum
of the cost that nodes of the tree that are not leaves want to
be rewarded and TMT is the minimum of the corresponding
timeouts of these costs. The cost CMT can be modified by two
events: either a new node joins the multicast group or TMT is
reached.
a) When a node N joins the multicast group,: it reaches
the nearest tree member M (i.e. the node which sends the
RREP to it). Each node on the path from N to M adds its cost
in the packet as well as the number of packets it will forward
at this cost. Then, M can calculate the new cost CMT as well
as the new number of packets this cost is valid for:
Cnew
MT
= Cold
MT
+ Cr + Cm,
where Cr is the cost added by the nodes on the path from
N to M , and Cm the number of nuggets asked by M (this
cost is equal to 0 if M was not a leaf before as it is already
included in CMT ). The new timeout of the multicast tree is
T newMT = min(T
old
MT , Tr, Tm),
where Tr is the minimum provided by the nodes on the path
between N and M and TM is the timeout provided by M if it
was a leaf. When the new values are computed, M multicasts
them to the tree.
Fig. 4. Propagation of TMT (li) in the multicast tree.
b) If the maximum number of packets (TMT ) has been
sent,: each leave li of the multicast tree sends its new couple
(C(li), TMT (li)) to its parent in the tree (C(li) is the cost
asked by node li to forward one packet to the multicast group).
The parent can then compute the new cost by adding its
children costs and the minimum number of packets, and sends
them to its parent recursively until the group leader is reached
(see Figure 4). At last, the group leader can decide what is
the new couple (CMT , TMT ) for the tree and sends it back to
the tree members.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we give evaluations of the algorithms we
propose on the nugget protocol. For each graph, the number
of experiments depends on the convergence of results: we
run sequences of 100 experiments until the evolution of the
average is less than 1%.
We have experimented the algorithms on a uniform network,
which is the worst case for the multipath solution. The
simulated networks are composed of 200 nodes that are placed
uniformly on a 650m × 650m square. The communication
range of nodes is 100m and they start with full battery level
that allows them to send 1000 data packets. The experiment
stops when the nodes do not have nuggets anymore or when
the network is not connected anymore (there are at least two
connected components). We simulate 5 algorithms: shortest
path with a cost of one nugget per hop (unitary cost),
shortest path with a variable cost which is proportional to
the energy spent since the network has started (variable
cost max-e), shortest path with a variable cost which is
computed using the functions and initial conditions given in
[6] (variable cost BH), and the two last ones with the
multipath algorithm (multipath max-e, multipath BH).
We can see on Figure 5(a) that the total throughput of the
network admits few variations. Anyway, the solution with
multipath is always better. The main point to notice is that
the total throughput mainly depends on the initial number
of nuggets: if this number is very high, there is no nugget
famine and each node can send its packets at the maximal
rate. Anyway the goal of the nugget model is to enforce
node cooperation by making nodes greedy of nuggets: if they
have enough nuggets for their own packets, they will not
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Fig. 5. Throutput and lifetime vs initial number of nuggets.
be enforced to cooperate. Figure 5(b) shows the lifetime of
the network in the same experiments: if the initial number
of nuggets is greater than 1000 the lifetime of the network
is constant, this corresponds to the case when nodes are
never starving of nuggets. For example, with unitary cost, the
average cost of a route is 3 so starting with 3000 nuggets
ensures each node to be able to send its own packets with its
battery power without any cooperation. If we look at Figure
6, which is the parametric throughput versus lifetime graph
when initial nugget number varies, we see that variable
max-e always dominates the unitary cost. We can notice
that parameters given in [6] lead to a behavior very similar to
the unitary cost.
In Figure 7, we can see the number of inactive nodes (starv-
ing of nuggets or battery less) depending on time for variable
cost protocols with DSR route discovery and multipath route
discovery. We can observe that for same performances in terms
of total throughput and network lifetime, we have less inactive
nodes in the multipath solution; it reflects the fact that the
traffic is well balanced in the multipath solution.
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VI. CONCLUSION
We have given some improvements to the virtual currency
models that help to make the protocol realistic and efficient.
We also give an algorithm that makes them work for the
multicast. Moreover, we show that the use of variable costs
combined with a multipath route discovery algorithm leads to
a better load balancing of the network.
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